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I have expropriated the title of Prichard's 1912 paperl because, I too answer his question 
affinnatively. But the mistake I detect is not the one Prichard thought he had uncovered, and his 
article is a classic example of the mistake I propose to discuss. It is to believe, as some moral 
philosophers still appear to do, that moral philosophy has a special domain or special method that 
distinguishes it in some important way from sociology, anthropology, psychology and economics. I 
shall argue that these moral philosophers are misled by the "philosophical" vocabulary they use. 
I have two reasons for recommending to moral philosophers that they abandon such tenns as 
"moral principle," "moral law," moral intuition," "original position" and the rest of the traditional 
vocabulary. First, it encourages them to sublime-to etherealize-their discipline-by constructing 
over-arching, but empty, theories, and so distracts them from developing the kind of small-scale 
theory that would help generate the guidelines needed by people in moral quandaries. 
Second, the moral-principle vocabulary misleads them. Rather than referring, as they 
believe it does, to features of the world that are distinctive in some way, different from the features 
of the world referred to by such social-scientific tenns as "social nonn," "decision rule," 
"perception," "starting point for negotiation," it only expresses attitudes of the moral philosophers-
specifically, the affective states aroused in them when they think about the difficult decisions that 
they and other people must make in this uncertain world. 
Thus this paper is addressed only to moral philosophers, and indeed to them only when they 
are doing moral philosophy.2 I am not, that is to say, recommending wholesale elimination of the 
traditional language. Most people who are concerned about doing the right thing need some psychic 
support when they are at difficult decision points; at such times the traditional language is likely to 
be helpful. Moreover, a complex web of social, political and legal institutions, not to mention 
literature and the arts, are embedded in and presuppose the traditional language. A linguistic 
revolution that swept all this away, if per impossible it could be carried out, would have an enonnous 
and unpredictable impact on the culture. In contrast, the revolution I am proposing is very modest; it 
would affect only the way in which moral philosophers talk moral philosophy with each other. 
Thus the thesis of this paper is that the discussions of moral philosophers amongst 
themselves would gain much and lose nothing of consequence if they abandoned the traditional 
vocabulary. After setting it out (Section I), I shall illustrate it by giving sketches, in a social-roles 
language, of two features of the moral life that moral philosophers usually discuss in a moral-
principles vocabulary: a suggestion about the nature of moral commitment, a suggestion, that is, 
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about why people believe they have an obligation to do so-and-so (Section II) and a suggestion about 
the causes of moral change, a suggestion, that is, about why, on occasion, they cease to believe they 
have an obligation to do so-and-so and come to believe they have an obligation to do such-and-such 
(Section III). 
I shall then try to anticipate what I believe are the main criticisms that moral philosophers 
will level against this reduction. This discussion falls into two sections which reflect the differing 
reactions of moral philosophers to what Alastair MacIntyre calls "the Enlightenment Project.,,3 He 
argues that the project was a complete failure: it deprived moral rules of their former justification 
without being able to generate an alternative justification that has won general acceptance. 
Generally speaking, moral philosophers have reacted to this situation in one or the other of two 
ways. One group, whom I shall call realists4 and who for the most part are foundationists, either 
reject MacIntyre's conclusion that the Enlightenment Project has failed or, like MacIntyre himself, 
believe that another strategy of justification is possible. The issue between myself and these 
philosophers is of the deep kind that I call a difference in world viewS (Section IV). 
The second group, whom I shall call nonrealists and among whom I include the 
constructivists, have abandoned attempts to justify moral rules and turned their attention to other 
problems, for instance, to uncovering the logic of those rules. My approach to this second group of 
philosophers will be to ask why, given their seemingly very different conception of the task of moral 
philosophy, they continue to use a vocabulary that is so closely associated with the realists' efforts to 
justify moral rules (Section V). 
I 
I start from the (obvious) fact that people assess their own and other people's actions both 
retrospectively and prospectively. They say such things as "that would be frightfully nice," "that was 
callous," "that would be indecent," "that was splendid," "that would be monstrous." Since the list of 
terms with which people praise and blame, point with pride and view with alarm, seek to encourage 
and to deter is enormously long, I shall concentrate on the terms in which people declare that they 
and others have a duty to do something or a duty to abstain from doing something. I choose this set 
of terms because moral obligation is a central concept for consequentialists and for neo-Kantians 
alike and because if the reduction of a moral-principles language to a social-norms language can be 
carried out for these terms, it should be possible to make a similar analysis of evaluative terms less 
saturated in the traditional platonizing world view. 
I shall argue that the duties people feel, and the duties that moral philosophers tell them they 
ought to feel, to perform such-and-such acts and to abstain from such-and-such other acts do not 
arise from the nature of those acts, as the moral philosophers agree in maintaining (even whilst 
differing amongst themselves as to whether acts are duties because they involve treating other people 
as persons or because these acts produce the greatest good for the greatest number). For any act 
whatever that is expected by the members of some social group can come to be felt as a duty by the 
members of that social group, and any act that is frequently repeated in the appropriate 
circumstances will come to be expected by the members of the social group. 
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But though all those acts that are held to be duties, fulfill expectations, not all acts that fulfill 
expectations are held to be duties. What, then, are the differentia of the latter? I shall define these in 
the reduced social-roles vocabulary, and I shall start with a simple example. Consider a new dean, a 
young outsider, who has come into office after the long reign of an autocratic predecessor. Uncertain 
what will be acceptable to the faculty, he seeks the advice of department heads regarding an 
administrative appointment he must make. This creates an expectation, however slight, on the part 
of the department heads that they will be consulted, and that their advice will be taken, regarding 
subsequent administrative appointments-something they would certainly never have expected from 
his predecessor. 
If he does consult them again this strengthens the department heads' expectations that the 
group will continue to be consulted. In due course, what was initially experienced merely as an 
expectation of future dec anal behavior comes to be experienced as decanal duty-not merely 
something that he happens to do but something that he ought to do. 
If the dean has internalized this expectation he will feel the same weight of censure (self-
blame), whenever he fails to consult the department heads, that the department heads feel against 
him. Social censure and self-blame operate powerfully to induce the dean to satisfy, and in 
satisfying to strengthen, the department heads' expectations, and eventually the practice of 
consultation will be incorporated in the by-laws of the faculty and approved by the trustees. It is 
practice, then, and the expectations arising from practice, that make it binding on the dean to consult 
the department heads. 
Thus a defeated expectation can generate moral indignation, but clearly, not every defeated 
expectation does. If the dean regularly arrives in his office at 9:00 a.m. people who have business 
with him will soon come to expect him to arrive at that hour and will plan their own day 
accordingly. If some day he does not tum up until noon they will doubtlessly be annoyed, but they 
will hardly feel indignation. What, then, are the differences in the social contexts of these two 
expectations that lead people to feel moral indignation when one of them is frustrated and only social 
annoyance when the other is frustrated? 
II 
This has brought me to the first of the two illustrative sketches I mentioned at the outset: I 
shall give an account, in a reduced, social-role language, of what people are feeling when they say, 
as on occasion they do say, that they are morally obliged to do such-and-such acts. 
Note, first, that the affect that I shall call moral indignation is distinguishable from the affect 
that I shall call social indignation in much the same way that the affect called fear is distinguishable 
from the affect called anger. Though fear and anger are quite similar affects, they differ enough for 
one to be able to ask how the circumstances in which a person feels fear differ from those in which 
that person feels anger. One might form the hypothesis that people tend to experience fear in 
situations in which they feel insecure and anger in situations in which they do not, and it would be 
possible to check this conjecture by asking people whether they have sometimes found their anger 
changing into fear as they realize that the person who aroused their anger is in a position to harm 
them. 
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I shall adopt an analogous procedure with respect to the distinction between indignation that 
is moral and indignation that is social, and I shall suggest two features of the context that cause 
people to experience moral indignation in distinction from social indignation. Further, I shall argue 
that, just as it is possible to distinguish between fear and anger without assuming that one of those 
affects has a superior status (cosmically? metaphysically?) so it is possible to distinguish between 
social and moral norms without having to buy into moral realism, which, as I shall argue in Section 
IV, would involve having to swallow some very unpalatable beliefs. 
What, then, are the two contextual features that result in an experience of moral, rather than 
social, obligation? The first is that people see violation of the norm in question as not merely a 
solecism, but as a threat to themselves or to what they hold dear. An example might be the 
hullabaloo fifty years ago over King Edward VIII's desire to marry a divorcee. Some Britons 
probably could not have cared less; others-amongst them possibly members of the Labour Party-
were delighted at this sign of disrespect for the Establishment. Still others, however, elderly 
members of the upper class, for instance, experienced moral indignation at the violation of a norm 
that they took to be symbolic of their whole way of life. 
Another example is the change in attitude toward smoking that is now occurring. Twenty 
years or less ago smoking in public places, so far from violating any social norm, conformed to one 
and was consequentially admired. More recently, and as a result, of course, of the increasing 
evidence of a correlation between smoking and lung cancer, smoking has come to be censured 
because it conflicts with a new social norm. Indeed, so widespread is the indignation over the 
adverse effects of smoking on the lungs of nonsmokers that it is moving rapidly toward becoming 
the violation of a moral, not merely social, norm. What, a short time ago, was social annoyance is 
becoming moral indignation. Thus norms are context-relative. What is a social norm at tl for I 1 
may be a moral nOlm for her at t2 and already a moral norm for 12 at tl' 
So much for the first feature of social situations that may cause what would otherwise be 
experienced as social indignation to be experienced as moral indignation-may, that is, cause what 
would otherwise be a social norm to be a moral norm. In order to understand the second feature, 
notice that when we are dealing with another person rather than with inanimate nature, we believe 
that her behavior means something, and also that it means to her pretty much what it means to us. If 
we didn't believe this we would never seek to interact with others; we would merely react to their 
behavior, as we react to a stone that is falling in our direction. In the case of people, as in the case of 
stones, we of course observe behavior, but in the case of people, in contrast to the case of stones, we 
observe behavior in order to be able to infer intentions, and we respond, not only to the behavior, but 
to what we take those intentions to be. 
For instance, someone extends his right arm from his side; I read this as an intention to 
shake hands. Instead, his arm continues to move up towards his face-I see that his intention is to 
remove his glasses. I am mildly embarrassed, possibly disappointed, but I am not indignant. Moral 
indignation is one's response when the misreading involves a particular kind of intention, the 
intention to cooperate. Generally speaking, people feel moral indignation when (1) they have read a 
bit of someone else's behavior as meaning an intention to cooperate, (2) that person's cooperation 
would help them and his failure to cooperate would harm them, (3) it turns out they have misread 
it-it was not an intention to cooperate, and (4) they believe their original reading was justified-the 
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other person constructed his behavior carelessly, or he changed his mind without giving warning, or 
he wanted it to be misread. 
When it is a matter of inferring, or reading, the intentions of people involved in any sort of 
joint activity-Hume's example of two men, each with an oar, engaged in rowing a boat is a good 
one-each party is likely to read the other's behavior as showing an intention to continue the activity 
that is under way. The possibility of social life depends on most people developing this kind of 
expectation in most situations involving joint activity; clearly, cooperation cannot wait on the 
successful negotiation of explicit contracts. 
Three further comments: First, there may be disagreement among the participants about 
whether the pattern of behavior in which they are involved is, or is not, a pattern of cooperation. The 
department heads, believing that the dean's behavior in consulting them fits the pattern of 
cooperation, are indignant when he ceases to consult. He, however, may see his behavior as fitting 
the learning-to-do-my-job pattern, in which case his behavior does not in the least commit him to 
consult once he has gained the experience he thinks he needs. Here again, then, what is a social 
norm for 11 at tl may be a moral norm for 12 at tl and, quite possibly, a moral norm for I 1 at t2' 
In cases of this kind much depends on whether one party to the disagreement can persuade 
the other that his understanding of the other's behavior was warranted. The critical question for each 
party is thus the other party's intentions: Did he mislead me, or did I misread him? If the two 
parties cannot agree about whether it is a case of misleading or of misreading their dispute may have 
to be referred to the courts, which, over the centuries, have developed rules for deciding whether 
such-and-such a verbal expression means that an understanding exists. 
Second, explicit promises and formal contracts (the verbal expressions on which courts 
focus attention) do not underlie cooperation and "justify" it. On the contrary, behaviors that reflect 
and depend on social expectations can be seen operating in societies far too simple even to have 
conceived explicitly the notions of promise-keeping and contracting, let alone to have formulated 
explicit rules. But of course, once promise-keeping and contracting emerge as social institutions 
they provide alternative routes to commitment. And because people on the whole keep promises and 
fulfill contracts, violations occasion moral indignation, just as does any failure to continue 
cooperation once it has begun. 
Third, cooperation does not actually have to be underway for one party to expect that the 
other means to cooperate. Suppose a patient fails to keep his first appointment with a physician. 
Though the physician has no reason, based on prior experience with this patient, to expect him to be 
punctual, the physician knows-and the patient presumably knows-that the role of physician and 
the role of patient involve cooperation at many points, including the making and keeping of 
appointments. It is enough if the actual behavior (telephoning, asking for an appointment, accepting 
it) fits the pattern of cooperation. 
Thus, while I of course agree that people commonly distinguish between moral and social 
norms, this distinction can be captured without attributing any special transcendental status to moral 
norms, that supposedly distinguishes them from the social norms that moral philosophers readily 
admit vary across cultures. The moral necessity which people experience in connection with moral 
norms, is not in the norms, which are just whatever they happen to be, but in people's attitudes 
toward them. It is, as Hume wrote of natural necessity, something "which wejeel in the mind,,,6 
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specifically what we feel whenever we come to realize that behavior we had read as a sign of a 
readiness to cooperate was not such a sign. 
To summarize: I have given an account of the difference between moral and social norms 
that parallels the analysis a psychologist might give of the difference between fear and anger, and 
has no more of a hidden metaphysical agenda. She might indeed suggest that anger is a "better" 
(because healthier or otherwise more useful) affect than fear, but it surely would not enter her head 
to argue that for this reason anger has a superior ontological status. Why, when they are discussing 
the difference between social and moral norms, do moral philosophers feel the need to make this sort 
of move? I shall return to this question in Section V. 
III 
I have now given a sketch, in a reduced, social-role language, of why people come to feel 
moral commitments-an account, that is, of why people believe themselves and other people to be 
obliged to perform or to abstain from performing such-and-such acts. I shall now give a sketch of 
how and why moral commitments change, the second feature of the moral life which I mentioned at 
the start of this paper. 
The history of culture is strewn with commitments that have been abandoned, and not only 
abandoned, but repudiated: burning heretics, for instance, slaughtering Jews, drowning witches. 
How can all this wreckage be explained in the social-role language that I am recommending? 
Doesn't an explanation of moral commitment in terms of social roles lock the commitments, once 
made, into place? 
This objection ignores the fact that a role is not a straightjacket; it is a loosely fitting 
garment, which the wearers are constantly adjusting, opening up a seam here, taking one in there. 
Adjustments of this kind-modulations, I shall call them-are intrinsic features of all roles, not 
occasional occurences in otherwise fixed and static roles. Accordingly, obligation, understood in the 
reduced way I have proposed, so far from being an all or none affair, is a matter of differential 
weights that are attached to the norms that are embedded in, and that, collectively, form the role; and 
these differential weights vary over time and from role-player to role-player. 
A modulation is large if it affects a norm that people think is important; hence large 
modulations usually raise what are perceived as "moral" issues, whereas proposed small modulations 
raise only "social" issues. Modulations, large or small, are initiated when a few members of some 
social group notice what seem to them to be relevant similarities and differences which most 
members of that group, having less sensitive antennae, have overlooked. And they are successful, if 
they are successful, because when they are called to the attention of the less sensitive, they are 
acknowledged to be relevant. 
Thus, when Mr. Knightley pointed out to Emma the disparity between the role of lady and 
her behavior to Miss Bates-"I cannot see you acting wrong, without a remonstrance. How could 
you be so unfeeling to Miss Bates? How could you be so insolent in your wit to a woman of her 
character, age, and situation?"-Emma "was most forcibly struck. The truth of his representation 
there was no denying. She felt it at her heart. ,,7 She saw that, to be consistent, she had to extend the 
scope of the norm "lady" to Miss Bates. 
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Suppose that the other members of Highgate society had also been cold -shouldering Miss 
Bates. It is possible that, like Emma, they would all see that Mr. Knightley's three similarities were 
relevant. If so, the scope of the norm "lady" would have been enlarged in that Sussex village. But 
had their view of "lady" differed markedly from Mr. Knightley's and Emma's, they might not have 
followed his lead. In that event, and despite his success with Emma, Mr. Knightley's perception of 
similarities would have been an aberration. For, though criteria of relevance obviously change over 
time, the criteria, whatever they are, that are perceived as relevant by the members of some social 
group are relevant for that social group at that time. 
This applies as much to the perception of similarities (and dissimilarities) that are relevant to 
moral norms as it does to similarities (and dissimilarities) that are relevant to social norms. This is 
why I have brought Mr. Knightley, Emma, and Miss Bates into the discussion. Today that particular 
modulation, and the differentiations in the environment to which it was responsive will be viewed as 
trivial, though they were weighty for the social class of which Mr. Knightley, Emma, and Miss Bates 
were members. 
The fact that what was once weighty can become trivial reinforces my thesis that there is no 
difference between the ways in which small-scale and large-scale modulations are introduced, and no 
difference in the ways in which they become established, if indeed they become established. 
Modulations that take on, and so become a part of the culture are now defended as correct usage by 
all the moral conservatives who, earlier, had condemned them as dangerous deviations. 
Large-scale modulators-Beecher and his fellow abolitionists, for example- are not 
fundamentally different from small-scale modulators like Mr. Knightley. Both call attention to the 
fact that people who are outside some norm as it is currently understood (slaves; Miss Bates) are 
similar in a respect that the modulators regard as relevant to those inside the norm (human beings; 
ladies). Both point out that exclusion from the norm harms those who are excluded. Both feel 
strongly about the harm and try to communicate their feeling to others, whose changed behavior, if 
they are influenced by the modulator, will change the norm in the desired direction. Those already 
included in the norm are more likely than not to regard themselves as harmed-loss of privileged 
status, position, etc.-if those excluded come to be included, and they too may feel very strongly 
about this. 
Thus the operative norm8 at any particular time may be thought of as a mean between the 
position of those who want to make the norm more inclusive and those who want to make it less 
inclusive-the "pro-life" lobby is a current example of the latter desire. Other examples are the 
norms that specify who is eligible to vote (whites only? also Blacks? men only? also women?), what 
a human being is (all fetuses? if not, how mature?), and the rights of animals (unconditioned? if not, 
how conditioned? all animals? if not, which? rattlesnakes as well as cats and dogs?). As of now, 
there is no consensus on these and many other issues. Public opinion will doubtless settle down, as 
proposed modulations are either accepted or rejected. But at least in the kind of society we live in 
today, no norm stays fixed for very long. 
In a word, the mean moves over time, sometimes becoming more inclusive, sometimes 
becoming less. Once a substantial number of members of the social group have accepted the 
modulation and adjusted their behavior accordingly, it may begin to move rapidly. This can be 
accounted for in terms, once again, of social expectations. As one finds that more and more of one's 
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fellows expect one to accept the modulation, it becomes increasingly likely that one will find reasons 
for going along. Since most people carry around with them a reservoir of reasons,9 there is seldom 
much of a problem about finding them. Thus it is not difficult to account for the emergence of a 
consensus once a mean begins to move. 
But why does the mean begin to move? Why do social expectations change enough for most 
people to want to go along? These are questions that, as it seems to me, moral philosophers should 
consider, for it is idle to ask what one's duty is with respect to x until a consensus of expectations 
concerning the performance of x has emerged. Philosophers ask questions about what one's duty is 
because they seldom take the fact of social change very seriously. And for the same reason their 
answers, however disguised they may be by the traditional timeless vocabulary, are usually in terms 
either of some earlier or of some projected future consensus of expectations. 10 
To summarize: When in the reduced language I am recommending, one equates an 
obligation to do:! with the social expectations for some role, one must bear in mind that this role is 
constantly changing as people respond in various ways, and at various rates, to the various 
modulations proposed by various modulators. If one slips into thinking of some role synchronically 
and looks at "instantaneous" slices of time, which is how moral philosophers usually look at roles, 
then the role looks stable and uniform; it changes, if at all, only between successive synchronic 
slices. It seems highly paradoxical to define obligations, as I do, in terms of social expectations and 
also to insist, as I do, that expectations change. 
However, if one thinks diachronically, as social psychologists and cultural anthropologists 
tend to do, the paradox disappears. All sorts of modulations, large and small, are emerging, gaining 
adherents, losing them, gaining them again .... There is now no longer anything like an agreed-on 
set of expectations that completely determine every role player's duty. Instead, at any time a number 
of different sets of expectations are making claims against the role-players, some of whom are more 
responsive, some less responsive, some responsive in this respect, some in that respect, to the various 
claims. From this point of view the interesting questions are why, in such fluid situations, a 
consensus, i.e., a relatively stable obligation sometimes emerges; why it has coalesced on this, rather 
than some other, modulation; why it eventually dissolves. I shall discuss these questions briefly in 
the next section. 
Meanwhile, what is the appropriate stance for moral philosophers to adopt, given the fact 
that norms continuously modulate? Since the traditional language powerfully suggests that norms 
Creal" norms) do not modulate, one could hope that they would abandon the traditional language. 
My two illustrative sketches have been written with this recommendation in mind. Freed from the 
traditional language, moral philosophers might move away from their fixation on high-level, very 
abstract theories of doubtful relevance to real life and tum their attention to devising lower-level 
guidelines-alternatively, "hypothetical imperatives"ll-that would be relevant to the problems of 
people in quandaries. 
Even philosophers who are far less skeptical than I am of the possibility of bridging the gap 
between such lower-level principles and the super-principles with which moral philosophers usually 
busy themselves, might at least agree that small-scale theory, if not a substitute for large-scale theory 
construction, would be a useful propaedeutic. 
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IV 
I shall now set out and reply to what I believe are the two chief objections that will be raised 
against this reduced view by the moral realists, as I have called philosophers who reject MacIntyre's 
Enlightenment Project root and branch. 
First, they will argue that the reduced view cannot account for the categorical nature of 
moral rules. People, they will point out, want to justify their actions; they want good reasons for 
what they do. Unless there are moral principles on which the pursuit of good reasons terminate, the 
whole structure of reasons collapse. The possibility of justifying one's action, in distinction from 
merely finding support for it in public opinion, vanishes. 
Second, they will argue that people have an obligation to perform certain acts even if these 
acts are not elements in any social role whatever, indeed, even if these acts are directly antithetical to 
acts which important social roles require. And they will maintain that this independent-of-roles 
feature of such obligations cannot be accounted for unless there are transcendental norms, i.e., norms 
that are independent of people's beliefs and expectations. 
(1) My reply to the first of these two arguments is that the reduced view can provide as 
much justification for moral principles as they need and-as it were-deserve. Most people, 
certainly, want good reasons for what they do. The culture is a fertile supplier of reasons, and if 
some reasons have staying power it is because they appear to at least some people to be good ones. 
Most people, most of the time, can find several reasons for doing what they want to do, and they 
offer one or another of these reasons to different challengers, choosing for each challenger a reason 
that they believe will appeal to her as a good one. That is to say, the problem for most people most 
of the time is less to find a reason that satisfies oneself than to find one that satisfies other people, 
one that, above all, does not expose one to the charge of inconsistency. 12 People do not like to be 
told, "Yesterday you abstained from doing so-and-so. Today in an exactly similar situation you are 
doing so-and-so." Hence they will try to find a good reason for treating the two cases as 
"fundamentally" different, despite the "superficial" similarity which the objector has pointed out. If 
these reasons are challenged, further reasons can be produced. 
Sooner or later, of course, the process of justification, the process of finding good reasons, 
like all processes, has to end-no further reasons can be adduced. At this point the challenger is 
either satisfied or she is not. Given the fact that the culture is a fertile supplier of reasons-that it is, 
simply reflects the variety of human nature and the complexity of the situations in which people 
act-it is unlikely that all challengers will be satisfied. If they are not there's the end on it. Moral 
realism does not bring it about that agreements are actually reached. The reduced view does not 
bring it about that agreements are not reached. Both views are compatible with there being a 
distinction between those who pigheadedly refuse to give any reasons at all and those who, because 
they look for reasons, sometimes reach an agreement. 
People sometimes cut short the process of finding good reasons for a decision by appealing 
directly to a moral principle. I suggest that a moral principle is simply an expectation that has been 
abstracted from all of the roles in which it is actually embedded. Behaviors that are specific to one 
and only one role are not likely to be abstracted from the social role of which they are a part and 
elevated to the status of a principle, but behaviors that are expected in many different roles are easily 
abstracted and so come to be considered as "universally" or "categorically" binding, merely because 
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they are expected in many social situations and are so given a moral priority over any and all of the 
roles in which these expectations are actually embedded. 
But when people to whom this view may seem plausible as long as it is stated in general 
terms are at choice-points in everyday circumstances (in contrast to being confronted with some 
contrived and artificial "case" that moral philosophers have concocted) they seldom look to moral 
principles for guidance. Rather, they ask themselves what is required by the specific social role-
e.g., that of a father or that of a university president-they happen to be performing at the time they 
have to choose, for instance, between lying and telling the truth. 
A university president who on occasion lies to his faculty without a qualm might not for a 
moment consider lying to his wife. A physician who would tell the truth about a very gloomy 
prognosis to a young man with family responsibilities (his good reason might be that the young man 
needs to get his affairs in order) might lie to an elderly patient with the same prognosis ("Let him die 
in peace"). And so on. 
Thus when a norm ("Do not lie") is contemplated from a distance it may very well look 
universal, categorical, role-transcendent. But as one moves close up in order to decide how to behave 
in this or that particular situation, it turns out to have a series of local habitations and to be as 
context-relative as any so-called social norm. But the expectations from several similar roles in 
which one has performed in the past and in which one expects to perform again in the future 
accumulate and add weight to the expectations associated with the role in which one must act in the 
present. Violation of such a norm is experienced as a graver offense, and so as the violation of a 
moral, in distinction from a social, norm. 
Few contemporary moral realists, I suppose, hold moral principles to be simple unqualified 
commands-"Never lie," Never take a life." On the contrary, they are ingenious in working out the 
ways in which principles are qualified. But they appear to believe (1) that all the qualifications can 
be spelled out, at least "in principle," (2) that these "spellings out" are not exhaustively accounted for 
by differences in social roles, and (3) and that when they have been spelled out they are categorically 
binding on all people everywhere who find themselves in the spelled-out situations. 
These assumptions are highly questionable. In the first place, what does the phrase "in 
principle" mean? How does it function in the kinds of sentences into which philosophers insert it? 
"Such-and-such is possible in principle" seldom claims that such-and-such is do-able if one has 
enough time. More often, it is a way of covering a retreat from an overextended commitment, a way 
of acknowledging, without explicitly admitting, that such-and-such is not do-able. In the second 
place, social practices, and the roles they generate, multiply so rapidly that, no matter how many 
qualifications moral realists introduce, they will never be able to take account of all the relevant 
differences across cultures, age cohorts, and economic classes. 
The moral realists' examples are drawn from the opinions and practices of upper-middle 
class, late twentieth century Americans. But even with respect to such an unrepresentative subset of 
human kind, they seldom make any serious attempt to ascertain whether there is a consensus on any 
of the formulas that these philosophers hold to be universally recognized moral principles (for 
instance, "Lying is wrong, except the following circumstances ... " "Life is sacred, except ... ,,).13 
And verbal consensus on norms, were the moral realists actually able to show there is verbal 
consensus, would be no more reliable in revealing actual opinions and in predicting behavior than is 
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the virtual consensus of the affirmative answers to a pollster's question, "Do you want peace?" (or 
"lower taxes?" or "a balanced budget?"), as long as the answerers never consider what they might 
have to sacrifice for peace, lower taxes or a balanced budget. Thus I would say that Alan Schwartz's 
comment on the "Responsibility Principle" recently proposed by Talbot Page as a guide for judges in 
determining tort liability, applies generally-"incontrovertible on the level of abstraction on which 
[it is] stated, but the moral consensus ... unravels in the face of actual cases."14 
In a word, moral realists tend to be a bit naive methodologically. But that is not my present 
point. Rather, it is that one must distinguish between those moral realists who need not and those 
who should take account of actual practices and opinions, that is between moral realists who define 
moral principles as unqualified (without ellipses) categorical commands-a view associated, perhaps 
mistakenly, with the name of Kant-and those who define moral principles as qualified (with 
ellipses) categorical commands. The latter, so far as they actually begin filling in the ellipses with 
conditions and qualifications, make principles look less and less like moral laws having a 
transcendental authority and more and more like empirical decision rules that can be adequately 
discussed in the reduced language-rules that, by eliminating the need to make a decision ab novo at 
every new choice point, simplify life and reduce the amount of muddle, confusion and contradiction 
in the world. That, surely, is justification enough for moral principles, without imposing on them the 
impossible burden of qualifying as "ultimate" good reasons. 
(2) I tum now to the second argument of the moral realists. In order to meet it I must give 
an account in the reduced language of the widespread feeling that people have duties (e.g., to free 
slaves) whether they, or indeed anybody at all, believe that freeing slaves is a duty. 
To begin with, it is an oversimplification to think of there being a sharp dichotomy between 
a monolithic block of modulators advocating some change and a monolithic block of opponents of 
the proposed change. On the contrary, there are a number of people who are, to a greater or lesser 
degree, modulating; there are other people who are, to a greater or lesser degree, resisting the 
modulation; there are still others who are marking time, hoping that the modulation will either 
succeed or fail before they have to act. Further-a very important point-these differing attitudes 
toward specific proposed modulations always occur against an extensive background of agreement 
on other social roles. 
For these reasons it is not unreasonable of modulators to expect at least some of their fellow 
citizens to adopt their modulation and hence to regard them as having a duty to do so. But for the 
same reasons it is not unreasonable of the modulators' fellow citizens to hold that the modulators 
have misread their intentions. Thus, to take the issue of slavery as an example, it was not wholly 
unreasonable of the abolitionists to have expected slaveholders to free their slaves. After all, the 
slaveholders were not a monolithic block, some were freeing their slaves in their wills; more felt 
uneasy about the institution of slavery, fearing that it might be inconsistent with their beliefs about 
civil rights. The abolitionists sawall this but did not see that though the slaveholders valued 
consistency, most of them valued their property even more. Hence, when the slaveholders opposed 
emancipation, when the abolitionists' expectations were defeated, it is not surprising that they 
experienced moral indignation. 
Today, when people-ordinary citizens as well as moralists-argue that freedom and 
equality are transcendental rights, i.e., that the slaveholders had a transcendental duty to free their 
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slaves and that they had this duty before they or anyone else believed they had it, these people are 
simply resonating with the abolitionists and sharing their disappointed expectations. Freedom looks 
to them like a transcendental norm because, knowing themselves to be living in a later time period 
than the one occupied by the abolitionists and the slaveholders, they believe themselves to be 
evaluating slavery dispassionately, i.e., "objectively." But-this is my point-phenomenologically 
speaking, they are not outside the time period containing the abolitionists and the slaveholders. 
They are very much inside it, united in sentiment with the abolitionists and sharing their indignation 
over their defeated expectations. So far from having discovered timeless, transcendental norms, they 
are simply identifying with the operative norms of the abolitionists. 
Thus an alternative account is possible of the widespread belief that duties (e.g. the duty to 
allow Blacks their civil rights), are role-independent. It will not appeal to the moral realists because 
there is a hidden personal agenda in their thesis that moral norms have a transcendental source. It is 
not so much that they are seeking, as they say they are, to justify the abolitionists' modulation-the 
enormous changes in attitudes and institutions that their initiative helped launch are surely 
justification enough. It is, rather, that they want to allay their anxiety about their own decisions at 
whatever choice points they may personally face. They can do this only if they feel assured that at 
every choice point there is something that is the right thing to do, even if they cannot always be sure 
what it is. 
Dewey and, earlier, Nietzsche recognized that the impetus for much philosophical thinking 
is a quest for certainty. The moral realists are a case in point. They are made uneasy by moral 
disagreements that terminate only because the disputants get tired, or work out a compromise, or 
agree to disagree. They want it to be the case that at every choice point there is a course of action 
that is the right one to choose, so that, though the disputants may not hit on it, there is at least the 
possibility of moral disagreements terminating because all parties have come to see what the right 
action is. 
The moral realists find the reduced view which I accept so easily, intolerable because they 
have a low threshold for living with moral dissonance and because on the reduced view it is not 
merely the case that it is often difficult to decide what one's duty is; rather, the concept of obligation 
is problematic. One can of course know, before a modulation begins to win adherents and after it 
has been widely accepted, what one's duty is. But when a consensus has been disrupted and before a 
new one has been achieved it is impossible to know what one's duty is, for at such times one's duty 
is indeterminate. At such times one can either (1) align oneself with some proposed modulation, 
hoping that one has guessed right and that it will prove to be the wave of the future, or (2) one can 
try to wait it out. Neither of these alternatives affords much comfort to people in quest of certainty. 
We have reached the very deep difference in world view that I mentioned at the start of this 
paper. The moral realists see the world (this of course is the way I try to explain to myself what 
seems to me the extreme oddity of their view) through a platonizing lens; whatever the lens through 
which I perceive the world, it is not platonizing. To me, through my lens, it is as evident that there is 
no objective, transcendental moral realm as it is evident to them through theirs that there is one. 
To the realists, I am trapped in a hermeneutical circle of beliefs, and beliefs about beliefs. 
Whether the beliefs are mine alone or those of my social group, or even those of all human beings 
(as might conceivably be the case) is immaterial, for without an outside reference point in something 
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which is not a belief, I am lost in subjectivism. 
To me, a henneneutical circle large enough to move around in is a comfortable place in 
which to engage in my traffic with nature and with other people. The realists are persuaded that 
belief systems that are not either suspended securely from the ceiling or resting finnly on the floor 
will collapse; I am persuaded that no belief system-large or small, chaotic or well organized-is 
ever pennanently anchored; all, even those seemingly most finnly fixed, are sooner or later seen to 
have been detached, and floating, the whole time. 15 
The realists see a fundamental metaphysical similarity between nature and morals; I am 
struck by the difference. I agree of course that for a very long time there was a close parallelism 
between beliefs about nature and beliefs about morals. Up until the period in which what MacIntyre 
calls the Enlightenment Project was well underway there was no reason not to believe in the 
existence of a moral order that was as objective as, even more objective than, the natural order. The 
problem for the moral realists-and it is this, of course, that makes them so hostile to the 
Enlightenment Project-is the contrast between the way in which, during the past 500 years, beliefs 
about nature have tended increasingly to converge and the way in which beliefs about morals have 
remained diverse and conflicting. Since 1600 people have had a reason, which strikes them as a 
good reason, for concluding that there is a physical nature that is independent of our beliefs about it, 
a reason which they did not have earlier and which they still do not have for believing in the 
existence of a correspondingly independent moral realm. The parallelism that was "obvious" before 
1600 has long since disappeared, at least for those who do not view the world through a platonizing 
lens. 
Nor, finally, will there be agreement over whether the reduced view is dangerously 
subversive. I agree that a political elite-like the one Plato sketched in The Republic-would be a 
great danger if it were to adopt an esoteric language which could be used to manipulate the opinions 
and practices of the masses. But the chances of moral philosophers becoming a political elite are 
sufficiently remote for worry on that score to be a sign of neurosis, and there seems no more to be 
feared from interchanges by moral philosophers in a technical language than from interchanges by 
astrophysicists or neurophysiologists in the esoteric languages that they use to discuss the problems 
they encounter in their disciplines. 
I take more seriously the argument that the reduced language I have proposed for moral 
philosophers might have adverse social consequences if it came to be widely adopted, for many, 
perhaps most, people are risk-averse, and uncertainty may induce indecision, weakness of will. Over 
the centuries, the authoritarian religions were a defense against scepticism. Now that religious faith 
has been weakened, the beliefs of the moral realists, offering an assurance that the moral realm is 
rational, are one of the few remaining bulwarks. 
To this line of argument I reply that this article will not be widely read and that most of 
those who are made uneasy by it have at their disposal, as do the moral realists, defensive strategies 
which will protect them from my thesis. Certainly it is true that modulations succeed or fail in part 
because people become aware of empirical evidence that seems to them relevant-the changing 
attitude toward smoking is an obvious example. And the strain for consistency, to which I have 
already referred, is also a factor. 16 But the larger the proposed modulation, the less likely it is that 
evidence and logic are detennining. When it is a matter of deep, strongly cathected attitudes, people 
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are less moved by argument than by something like esthetic taste. The model for understanding 
profound modulations, such as the one being discussed here, is surely more like the shift from 
Mozart to Schumann or from Gerome to Manet-than it is like the correcting of a faulty inference. 
To me this seems an adequate response to the charge of subversion. To the moral realists it will be 
very lame. Here again our arguments-theirs and mine-slip past each other without engaging or 
even making contact. Deep differences in world view generate non-terminating disagreements. 
V 
I tum now to a group of moral philosophers who operate (more or less easily) within the 
climate of opinion of which MacIntyre's Enlightenment Project was an early phase. Whereas the 
contention of the realists is, essentially, that I have not grasped what moral philosophy is about, the 
nonrealists, as I am calling the latter group, will say that they have long been doing just what I am 
urging them to do; I have been misled by their preference for using the traditional language to 
discuss what I want them to discuss. 
Perhaps the difference between myself and the nonrealists is merely semantical. I hope so, 
but I doubt it. For, as I have argued elsewhere, differential preferences for one term or another, when 
two terms refer to the same object, always reflect differential attitudes toward the object named and 
that sometimes these different attitudes are so deep that they amount to differences in world views. 17 
In an effort, therefore, to discover how disturbingly deep, or how satisfyingly shallow, is the 
difference reflected in my preference for the reduced language and their preference for the traditional 
language, I shall ask why they persist in using the traditional language. 
I shall begin by saying I believe retention of an otherwise outmoded vocabulary is usually a 
sign that this vocabulary is responsive to attitudes which are still entrenched in these users' mentalite 
despite their belief that they have abandoned them. With this as a working hypothesis, it is natural 
to ask what those entrenched attitudes are, and the answer is that they vary from case to case. For 
instance, one notices that men who believe that they have shed male chauvinism nevertheless cling 
to a vocabulary containing such words as "postman," "policeman," and "chairman." Although inertia 
may account for this usage in some cases, it is surely not implausible to suspect that at least some of 
these men are not yet fully liberated. Analogously, I shall argue that the traditional moral 
vocabulary survives in the writings of the nonrealists, who believe they have put foundationism and 
metaphysical ways of thinking behind them, because it enables them to enjoy metaphysical cake 
without having to eat it. 
Consider, for a start, the non-realists' discussions of moral rules. One can read these 
discussions with an eye to whether they have got the structure of these rules "right" (which is the 
way they expect their discussions to be read and the way most philosophers in fact read them). Or 
one can read them, as I propose to, 18 with an ear for the subtexts, or latent meanings that their 
discussions express, in the same way that a persistent use of masculine nouns expresses a latent 
hostility to the Women's Rights Movement. Read in this way, much that is puzzling about the non-
realists' texts becomes transparently clear. They are animated by the same metaphysical anxieties 
that drive the realists to foundationism. The traditional language, functioning as a subtextuallevel, 
helps the non-realists allay these anxieties, whilst, at the textual level, nothing could be farther from 
their thought. 
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Where, for instance, from the point of view of the non-realists, "are" the moral principles 
discussed in their texts? Presumably, since the non-realists have abandoned transcendental norms, 
their principles are embedded in people's practices, and can be extracted from those practices 
inductively. Thus it is possible to "construct" the operative norms19 of a society from the actual 
practices20 of the members of that society, as linguists construct linguistic principles by observing 
people's speech practices. But the non-realists do not proceed in this way. Instead of starting with 
practices drawn from the behavior of a variety of social and ethnic groups and then moving 
inductively to provisionally formulated norms, they start with norms in which ex ante they seem to 
be supremely confident and then proceed almost anecdotally, employing what can best be described 
as a strategy of selective exemplification. Moreover, they often rely on anecdotes about science-
fictive creatures or on extremely artificial earth-bound cases to convince their readers. 
This otherwise curious procedure can be explained if one assumes that, despite protestations 
that they have modulated moral philosophy away from foundationism and in the direction of the 
empirical relevance, the nonrealists' discussions of the structure of moral principles are animated by 
a vision, which they share with the nonrealists, of the domain of human decisionmaking and 
institution-design as through-and-through "rational", as systematically well ordered. In a word, they 
too sublime morals, and in a way that parallels the subliming of logic that Wittgenstein deplored. 
His comments on the latter apply to the former: to those in the grip of this conviction, moral 
philosophy, "seeks to see to the bottom of things .... " They believe the moral realm "must be 
utterly simple," "prior to all experience," "of the purest crystal.,,21 Moral philosophers are subliming 
when, for instance, they take the strain for consistency, which operates differentially in different 
societies, as at once licensing their search for a single, all-inclusive and well-ordered system of 
moral rules and also as guaranteeing that they will find it. Thus the non-realists, as much as the 
realists if perhaps less obviously, are distracted from discussing the kinds of low-level guidelines 
that would be helpful to people in moral quandries. 
In their tendency to sublime, moral philosophers of course are not alone. Some economists 
and political scientists also sublime, but whereas these scholars come out of a social-scientific 
culture which is to some extent a counter-weight to the vision, the nonrealists, like the realists, come 
out of a platonizing culture that was the natural habitat of abstract principles. There is nothing, 
therefore, to discourage the nonrealists from drifting to high-level generalizations and ignoring the 
messiness of actual practices, the muddle of real-life opinions. 
Thus expressions like "moral principle" function in a more complex way in the texts of 
nonrealists than they do in the texts of realists. In the texts of the latter "moral principle" names 
whatever is named in my text by "transcendental norm"-if anything at all is named by the latter 
expression. In the texts of the nonrealists "moral principle" seems to refer to what, in my text, is 
called a decision-rule, or operative norm. But in their texts "moral principle" is also a part of a 
subtext, for at this point texts of Descartes and other early modem foundationists have been 
displaced-to borrow a term favored by deconstructionists-into the texts of the nonrealists. 
I suggest, then, that the nonrealists' preference for the traditional vocabulary can be 
accounted for by the fact that it is saturated with the odor of realism. Whereas "operative norm" is 
associated with an empirical stance and so invites investigation of the possibility that in different 
societies, or even in the same society, different, and incompatible, norms may be operative, "moral 
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principle" is associated with a platonizing stance and so protects the nonrealists from having to face 
the possibility of there being irrational choice-points, choice-points at which good reasons are to be 
found for choosing anyone of several choosing one over the others. alternatives but no better reason 
fo?2 
Again-to note another point at which the texts of moral philosophers carry a subtext-
calling truth-telling and other operative norms "moral principles" makes them look like categorical 
imperatives. Inasmuch as in normative social science the goals -less crime in the street, a balanced 
budget, full employment, for instance-are all evidently hypothetical, this displacement gives moral 
philosophers a seeming warrant for distinguishing their discipline from the part of social science that 
deals with normative issues. 
The cost of this declaration of independence is high. Calling truth-telling, for instance, a 
categorical imperative encourages the tendency of moral philosophers to indulge themselves in 
subliming and so leads them to formulate ends that are too abstract, grand, and remote to be helpful 
to people in moral quandaries. What is the use to a pregnant teenager, who is trying to decide 
whether to have an abortion, to be told to respect persons or, alternatively, to maximize happiness? 
I shall conclude this paper with three more examples of subtexts that, as I believe, are to be 
found in the texts of non realists. First, there is the use of a floating (as I shall call it) first-person 
plural pronoun, which makes the ancient consensus gentium argument available in a contemporary 
context. This argument-which, like the teleological proof of the existence of God, has 
psychological appeal disproportionate to its evidentiary weight-was attractive, and presumably is 
still attractive, because a rule on which all mankind agrees seems to have an authority that cannot be 
traced to political institutions or historical traditions, which vary from tribe to tribe. 
Nowadays an explicit appeal to a consensus gentium would convince few people. But the 
psychological appeal of the argument can be achieved indirectly, by a floating "we." Left 
unchallenged, it soars upward, in the texts of moral philosophers, from "you and I," to "our set," to 
"people like us," to "twentieth-century Americans,!! and so into the stratosphere of universal human 
nature. But if it is ever challenged, "we" can glide down to the level at which the writer believes the 
challenger may allow that the claim for a consensus is not wholly implausible. Since the moment 
the skeptic's back is turned, "we" unobtrusively floats up again, a consensus gentium is suggested 
without being asserted. 
Much the same can be said about "intuition." Unlike the realists, who can consistently hold 
that people intuit transcendental norms, nonrealists, if queried, are likely to say that by an intuition 
they mean a feeling or perception, the off-the-top-of-the-head reaction of some ordinary chap. But, 
they continue, there is a principle embedded in the feeling which, when analyzed will prove to be 
embedded in the often superficially different intuitions of other ordinary chaps. 
Taken at face value-that is, at the level of text-"intuition" thus makes only an empirical 
claim, i.e., a claim that further investigation will confirm or disconfirm. But "intuition" also 
functions in a subtext, for it is a term with a very long philosophical history, one which claims 
certainty for what is intuited and which holds intuitions to be the foundation on which knowledge (in 
this case, knowledge about how to live virtuously) rests. "Intuition" thus allows the nonrealists to 
imply, without explicitly saying, something they very much want to believe. 
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Finally, consider "original position." What does "original position" do for moral 
philosophers that a reduced phrase like "starting point for negotiating a change in relationship" 
cannot do? It straddles the chasm between the pre- and the post-Enlightenment mentalites. As with 
the floating "we," the meaning of "original position" can move from the empirical (in which case 
there may be quite a number of different and competing original positions, depending on which 
culture is the basis for one's "construction") to the transcendental (in which case there is one and 
only one ur-position. It can shift back and forth, as need arises, from the set of conditions that would 
exist if some particular society were to carry through a consistent application of its own basic 
assumptions to the set of conditions that generates a "really" just society and so holds for all 
societies everywhere. 
The association of "original" with a pre-lapsidarian state of affairs is a subtext in which the 
idea of "original" not merely as first but as uncorrupted, gives the expression an ambiguity that 
appeals to nonrealist moral philosophers. 
I conclude, then, that the traditional vocabulary survives in the writings of the non-realists 
because it enables them to make a transition, which is "imperceptible but ... of the last 
consequence,,,23 from (1) "is believed by the members of some social group to be obligatory," which 
is an empirical claim to (2) "is obligatory," which is a nonempirical, categorical claim. 
This transition is of the last consequence because, so long as it is imperceptible to the 
nonrealists, they can feel they have escaped from the hermeneutical circle which alarms them as 
much as it alarms the realists. But whither, into what third realm, beyond the physical realm and the 
realm of human experience, can they escape? Pending a satisfactory answer to this question-and 
the nonrealists, in my view, should tackle it directly, not bracket it as somebody else's problem-I 
shall continue to hold that moral philosophy rests on a mistake. 
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2. See below,pp. [12-13,21-22]. 
3. I would not myself talk about a "Project" at all. "Project" seems to suggest a well-bounded, 
well-defined undertaking supervised by people who knew what they were about. That is an ex 
post, historian-type assessment of what, for insiders, was a whole complex of messy, often 
confiicting efforts, themselves only a phase of that still, more complex, and even more loosely 
bounded collection of family resemblances called the Enlightenment. 
4. I have no doubt that some, perhaps all, of the philosophers I assign to this pigeon-hole will 
dislike this label. Although I have consulted friends and colleagues I have not found a term 
which will not give offense in some quarters, and, as Sweeney pointed out apologetically to 
Doris and Dusty, "I've gotta use words when I talk to you." 
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View," in The Philosophy of Brand Blanshard (1980); also Current Anthropology and Jaynes 
pieces. 
6. Enquiry, Sec. 7, Pt. II. 
7. Emma, vol. III, ch. vii. If readers prefer a real-life example to a literary one, Mr. Justice 
Bazelon's address at the 1981 annual meeting of the American Psychological Association 
illustrates the way a modulation can start. Relying on his long experience hearing cases in 
which psychological "experts" testify, the judge discussed what he called the "sins" of the 
profession: a tendency to make "conclusory pronouncements," a failure to "expose the facts 
under their conclusions" and "the values underlying their choices of facts," and a failure to 
"come clean on the uncertainties of opinion that may exist. ... " The fact that extensive excerpts 
from the address were printed in the APA Monitor, (vol. 12, no. 10) shows that this modulation 
is beginning to spread, though it is far from clear that it will eventually take on. 
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8. An "operative norm" is to be distinguished from an actual norm. The latter is a generalization 
about how people actually behave in such-and-such circumstances; the former is a 
generalization about how people should behave, i.e., a statement of a belief about the 
expectations of a social group in those circumstances. Since people's beliefs about how they 
and other people should behave affect how they behave, operative norms and actual norms tend 
to converge. But in some cases-in the area of sexual behavior, for instance-in some societies 
at some time they may diverge a great deal. 
9. See below, [po 14]. 
10. See below, [po 19]. 
11. See below, p. [26]. 
12. There is in most, perhaps in all, societies what can be called a strain for consistency which takes 
the form of an inclination to treat similars similarly. But societies differ about the respects in 
which similars are similar, about how similars must be to be treated as similar, and about the 
way they rank-order consistency as a desirable. 
13. The ellipses are intended to permit casuists to insert all the qualifications they wish to include 
before they declare that the principle in question is absolutely and categorically binding. 
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19. See note 8. 
20. Practices like lying to A and telling the truth to B; opinions like, "Well, I almost never lie to A-
ish people though I sometimes lie to B-ish people"-without formulating the A-ish and B-ish 
qualities she has in mind and without specifying what she means by "almost never" and 
"sometimes." 
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21. P.I. §§89-91, 97 
22. Guido Calabresi's recognition of this accounts for the acute distress that suffuses the pages of 
Tragic Choices. For Calabresi, at least, the vision splendid has faded into the light of common 
day. 
23. Treatise, Bk III, Pt. I, Sec. I. 
